Transparent voting in Congress is a problem. From the late 20th century onward, it is possible for observers to understand exactly how every member of Congress votes on every bill brought to the floor, and in most Congressional Committees, how every member on the Committee votes on each bill brought up for debate. This is information that is, outside of election seasons, not interesting or relevant to the typical American voter, much less American citizens.
Secret electoral ballots are necessary to prevent vote-selling and voter intimidation. Voter intimidation and vote-buying both require a means for the one attempting to influence the outcome of the vote to determine how individuals voted (and in places where election boycotts occur, who voted). If the one intimidated can promise one thing, do another, and lie successfully to the bully after the fact about the reason things did not go in accordance with the bully's wishes, intimidation is not a viable strategy. The same goes for vote-buying, with no receipt proving that the commodity sold was actually provided, attempting to buy votes can at times be counter-productive.
In the US Congress, with transparency for both voting and donations, someone seeking to influence the laws of the United States can do two dangerous things.
1) They can effectively distinguish legislators who vote for the influencer's interests from those who do not. This means that representatives who are 'bought' (or intimidated) can provide receipts in the form of votes on the record, and that representatives who refuse to be bought, or who do not 'stay bought' (they accept money, then refuse to vote the way the influencer intends) expose themselves individually.
2) They can effectively demonstrate their power to direct money to one side or the other in an election. This is analogous to 'showing the knife' during a mugging, or a blackmailer showing the media he intends to release. This is also a substantial 'carrot', as campaign donations can be directed to a leadership PAC controlled by the politician, and spent for nearly any purpose...after the politician is no longer a candidate for public office.
Furthermore, due to the committee system, an influencer has a relatively short list of targets for threats and bribes. If the change requires its own law, a bill must be rolled through committees in both the house and the senate, brought to the floor for a vote at a time when it is likely to pass, taken to conference, and signed by the president. If the change does not require its own law, it can be rolled into an annual 'must pass' bill in the relevant congressional committee, or failing that, be added during the conference committee discussion (this is how the provision prohibiting bonuses was removed from the AIG bailout). With donor transparency, an influencer or lobbyist can simply point out that the donor network in the industries he represents can move x amount of money into races that interest them, and that a member's vote on a particular issue will affect the direction those donors go. Heritage Action famously made calls during the 2013 government shutdown budget negotiations for this explicit purpose. Maintaining a large and disciplined donor network is fairly difficult, though we do see it for the most contentious issues.
Donor transparency does open an interesting avenue for individuals and interest groups without sizable donor networks. The list of people who donate to political campaigns in general is fairly short, and a large percentage of people who do donate do so on the basis of personal relationships with the candidate, or economic interests. Directly marketing negative advertisements (direct mail, internet, phone may or may not be subject to legal restrictions) to a targeted candidate's donor network using messages related to the candidate's past performance on high visibility issues (coded by donor demographics) could be effective at poisoning the well for future donations, as the first people a candidate calls when he needs to fund-raise are, unsurprisingly, the people who donated in the past.
Adding anonymity back into the system is probably good in the long-term, but may make the problem substantially worse in the short term, as information on past performance would probably be relied upon more strongly, and representatives with a history of fence-sitting or acting as a swing vote between competing factions would probably find themselves targeted.
Secret electoral ballots are necessary to prevent vote-selling and voter intimidation. Voter intimidation and vote-buying both require a means for the one attempting to influence the outcome of the vote to determine how individuals voted (and in places where election boycotts occur, who voted). If the one intimidated can promise one thing, do another, and lie successfully to the bully after the fact about the reason things did not go in accordance with the bully's wishes, intimidation is not a viable strategy. The same goes for vote-buying, with no receipt proving that the commodity sold was actually provided, attempting to buy votes can at times be counter-productive.
In the US Congress, with transparency for both voting and donations, someone seeking to influence the laws of the United States can do two dangerous things.
1) They can effectively distinguish legislators who vote for the influencer's interests from those who do not. This means that representatives who are 'bought' (or intimidated) can provide receipts in the form of votes on the record, and that representatives who refuse to be bought, or who do not 'stay bought' (they accept money, then refuse to vote the way the influencer intends) expose themselves individually.
2) They can effectively demonstrate their power to direct money to one side or the other in an election. This is analogous to 'showing the knife' during a mugging, or a blackmailer showing the media he intends to release. This is also a substantial 'carrot', as campaign donations can be directed to a leadership PAC controlled by the politician, and spent for nearly any purpose...after the politician is no longer a candidate for public office.
Furthermore, due to the committee system, an influencer has a relatively short list of targets for threats and bribes. If the change requires its own law, a bill must be rolled through committees in both the house and the senate, brought to the floor for a vote at a time when it is likely to pass, taken to conference, and signed by the president. If the change does not require its own law, it can be rolled into an annual 'must pass' bill in the relevant congressional committee, or failing that, be added during the conference committee discussion (this is how the provision prohibiting bonuses was removed from the AIG bailout). With donor transparency, an influencer or lobbyist can simply point out that the donor network in the industries he represents can move x amount of money into races that interest them, and that a member's vote on a particular issue will affect the direction those donors go. Heritage Action famously made calls during the 2013 government shutdown budget negotiations for this explicit purpose. Maintaining a large and disciplined donor network is fairly difficult, though we do see it for the most contentious issues.
Donor transparency does open an interesting avenue for individuals and interest groups without sizable donor networks. The list of people who donate to political campaigns in general is fairly short, and a large percentage of people who do donate do so on the basis of personal relationships with the candidate, or economic interests. Directly marketing negative advertisements (direct mail, internet, phone may or may not be subject to legal restrictions) to a targeted candidate's donor network using messages related to the candidate's past performance on high visibility issues (coded by donor demographics) could be effective at poisoning the well for future donations, as the first people a candidate calls when he needs to fund-raise are, unsurprisingly, the people who donated in the past.
Adding anonymity back into the system is probably good in the long-term, but may make the problem substantially worse in the short term, as information on past performance would probably be relied upon more strongly, and representatives with a history of fence-sitting or acting as a swing vote between competing factions would probably find themselves targeted.